Metaphysics, intelligence, God

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

" Originally Posted by MrRubix View Post
(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

Exactly. And you just strengthened my points with the paradox.


Not at all! This was just explaining why atoms are technically irrelevant.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

"Yes. I guess it makes sense to think that the X observer was still in the X1-specific atoms brain, in this case.

But, still, this scenario doesn't solve the paradox I just mentioned, at all.

In fact, it worsens it:

If you can say, for sure, that the person X will not come back with the X2-atoms brain, because the perspective was in the X1-atoms brain, What will happen after I disintegrate(damn, I was spelling it wrong the whole time) the X1 brain?

Well, once disintegrated, there are no more “parts”. This is the problem, considering what can happen after those working parts no longer exist.

Considering this last situation you mentioned, I can also say, for sure, that the identical X2 brain will not bring the person back after X1 was gone. Neither will a X3, X4, ..., Xn identical brain.

But you did say, posts ago, that the person would come back with the X1-atoms brain.

That means that the observer is still connected to the specific atoms, somehow.

And that goes against what we've concluded: "specific atoms don't matter". In this case, they really weren’t supposed to matter, since there are no working parts.

But, still if we suppose that they are connected to specific atoms after death: A "nonexistent” thing cannot be connected to atoms. It doesn't make any sense. Therefore, the observer did not cease to exist.

Is the observer the atoms? No, it can't be. We know that. The brain swaps it's atoms all the time.

Okay, now you can say that "Even with the same atoms and same composition, that will still not bring the person back".

Well,



It's the same brain. The same atoms, configuration, thoughts, memories. The same everything. If the same person that died does not wake up from the void and start experiencing things again,


then,


OBSERVER AND BRAIN ARE NOT THE SAME.


… Do you see?
Every option will lead to either an absurd situation or the eventual denial of a previous proposition."

The observer is only connected with the X1 atoms to the extent that they form the same structure. That structure may very well be disintegrated ashes of a brain. If I swap in one atom for another, the new atom becomes part of the "original structure" even though it is made of new parts. Therefore if you could bring that structure back, you bring back the original. Atoms do not matter.

Observer and the brain ARE the same.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

"Ok.
Again, once a brain was disintegrated, it will no longer have working parts.
What happens if I bring the first paradoxal situation in this reply?
If we can ignore atoms, that means I can create an endless number of identical brains. If none of these brains bring back the original observer, again, observer and brain are not the same."

If we create an endless number of identical brains, then we have an endless number of observers. If we've merely created a bunch of replicas and killed the original, then the original is of course dead.

Again, observer and brain -> linked.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

"Sorry, Rubix, but I still find paradoxes.

I am not forcing paradoxal situations, I just naturally stumble upon them.

I can’t see how a “soul” directly contradicts anything that’s physically proven. Can you please give me an example?"

A soul is not necessary to explain anything. We can explain everything physically. If you're going to assume a soul, you're buying into another line of arbitrary "maybes."

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

I didn't move the paradox anywhere -- I directly refuted your claim and resolved the paradox. If you recreate multiple replicas of my brain, then you are creating new brains with memories/etc, even though their personal perspectives were created as soon as you made a new brain. If I am simply being copied, then I of course maintain my own perspective. This doesn't clash against any BS claim I made earlier.

A replica is a replica. It isn't the same as the original.

The observer is only connected with the X1 atoms to the extent that they form the same structure. That structure may very well be disintegrated ashes of a brain. If I swap in one atom for another, the new atom becomes part of the "original structure" even though it is made of new parts. Therefore if you could bring that structure back, you bring back the original. Atoms do not matter.

A replica is a replica. It isn't the same as the original.
...
Atoms do not matter.

Okay, I might be crazy but I see a huge contradiction, here.

You said that the disintegrated ashes of a brain are still a structure.
It's not living, it's not perceiving anything. There are no working parts.
I thought that we could imply that a disintegrated brain would not enter the "replace life with life" category.

We can spread the ashes all around the world. There will be no "structure", then. I guess that there is no difference between making a brain with different individual atoms and swapping the atoms in the ashes one by one.



If the atoms don't matter, that means that, after the brain was disintegrated, I could create identical brains and they would still bring the person back. But you're saying that the person is only coming back with the X1-atoms which were spread all over the world, forming no structure at all.

So the person is still connected to the X1 specific atoms and only to them.
If the observer is connected to atoms even after there's no brain or parts or structure whatsoever, then the observer still exists and is clearly not the brain. It's something else.



Sorry, but it feels like, once you read my conclusion, you convince yourself that you've solved the paradox. But it seems like, when you answer a situation, you ignore the answers you gave to the other situations. And then you finish with "a soul is not necessary/ we can explain everything with the current postulations", as if it were the simplest thing in the world.



Tell me, if the atoms don't matter, what's the difference between two identical brains with exactly the same composition? Why will only specific atoms bring a person back?

Edit: Try to think about these problems as if the several identical brains were activated at the same time.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Sorry, been busy.

What I mean is that you can have a certain function -- but its composition is irrelevant to the extent that atoms swap in for its structure over time. Even though the end-state may be of completely different atom-source than the initial state, it's the same functionality.

Consider that, if the physical argument is indeed true, this makes sense. The observer depends entirely on the functions that derive it. So why does this also make sense with different atoms? If you're making a replica with different atoms, that is a different source. Yes, the end results may be isomorphic, but we're talking about the same body, here. We're technically shedding our atoms over time and, under your argument implications, "shifting our observer from one body to the next," which is true -- but we are not shifting our observer, just maintaining our core functionalities and changing its structure slowly over time.

If you're saying "kill person X, why isn't person Y acceptable now because they're made up of the same atoms that X would have become anyway/you then imply a linkage to atoms/etc." Yes, atoms matter to the extent that they define a structure, but do not matter in terms of the functionality itself, which is what gives us our perspectives. We're talking a swap here through the same body.

There is a difference between bringing about a 100% swap over time and just pointing to a replica. The implications are different.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Sorry, been busy.

Ah, okay.

Sorry, I know that post was unnecessary. I just wondered because I saw you replying to other threads in the meantime.

What I mean is that you can have a certain function -- but its composition is irrelevant to the extent that atoms swap in for its structure over time. Even though the end-state may be of completely different atom-source than the initial state, it's the same functionality.
...
There is a difference between bringing about a 100% swap over time and just pointing to a replica. The implications are different.

Alright, I do understand this.



But I was trying to point at a different problem: What happens after there is no structure left?

This time, let's suppose that not only your brain, but also your body was completely disintegrated, and the atoms were spread around the world. They are completely disconnected, now: there is no structure, no functionality.

What is it that differentiates the original and a replica, now?
Try looking through the perspective of the original observer.

I can create many identical brains and bodies, again, but they will certainly have their own observers. I mean, the original will not emerge from one of those new brains, I suppose.

But what about the original atoms? Does it still make sense to suppose that, if I recreate body and brain with the atoms that were spread, it will bring the original back?

We do know that individual atoms do not matter, after there is no structure.

If we suppose that the original is indeed coming back only with the original atoms, doesn't that mean that there was still something that connected the original observer to the original atoms?

If we suppose that the original is not coming back with an identical body and brain made with the original atoms: isn't that against the definition that observer and brain are the same? Because, well, it is the same brain.



We make the distinction between "original" observer and replicas of the observer because we understand that a perspective is not defined only by thoughts and memories. Otherwise, it would be the same observer for every identical brain, which is, by definition, impossible. Don't you think that both options are troublesome for the materialist belief, once we understand what an observer is?

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Ah, okay.

Sorry, I know that post was unnecessary. I just wondered because I saw you replying to other threads in the meantime.



Alright, I do understand this.



But I was trying to point at a different problem: What happens after there is no structure left?

This time, let's suppose that not only your brain, but also your body was completely disintegrated, and the atoms were spread around the world. They are completely disconnected, now: there is no structure, no functionality.

What is it that differentiates the original and a replica, now?
Try looking through the perspective of the original observer.

I can create many identical brains and bodies, again, but they will certainly have their own observers. I mean, the original will not emerge from one of those new brains, I suppose.

But what about the original atoms? Does it still make sense to suppose that, if I recreate body and brain with the atoms that were spread, it will bring the original back?

We do know that individual atoms do not matter, after there is no structure.

If we suppose that the original is indeed coming back only with the original atoms, doesn't that mean that there was still something that connected the original observer to the original atoms?

If we suppose that the original is not coming back with an identical body and brain made with the original atoms: isn't that against the definition that observer and brain are the same? Because, well, it is the same brain.



We make the distinction between "original" observer and replicas of the observer because we understand that a perspective is not defined only by thoughts and memories. Otherwise, it would be the same observer for every identical brain, which is, by definition, impossible. Don't you think that both options are troublesome for the materialist belief, once we understand what an observer is?

http://uwf.edu/jgould/documents/Mind-BrainandConsciousnessProblem_000.pdf

Anyways I would say that we are definitely more than just thoughts and memories -- we indeed have a process that defines "us" and our perspective/conscious mind. I would say that the mind is indeed just a process of the brain at work -- but regarding your question, I would say atoms are only irrelevant insofar as swapping in and out of a function. If you destroy the function, then you need to replace it with the same parts. Otherwise this is really no different from a transplant. But then let's consider a claim, "I want a full body transplant. Arms, legs, brain, everything." This would be like just killing the original guy and pointing to another man, saying "Alright, done, you're the transplant." I think we can replace parts of ourselves over time and keep ourselves FUNCTIONING to re-assimilate, as long as the mind is able to continue its process.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

I read the text from the link, alright.

But honestly, MrRubix, you are insisting on repeating something that I already agree with. You're not facing the exact problem I mentioned.

Sorry if it feels repetitive, but I don't feel like you're giving an answer to the same thing I'm talking about.


Let's try this again:

Your atoms were scattered across the world.

I can now create bodies with the same composition and configuration of your original body. They will feel like they were you, the original one. One of these bodies will have the same atoms from your original body.

But the question is: will you, the person who actually experienced the death, reappear in one of those bodies(you will BE one of them)? Will you still feel nothing, as if you were in the void?

Just choose an option, and I'll make more questions.

[devonin]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its componant atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

[Izzy]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its component atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

Seems obvious to me to. Unless it had the same memories and experiences. Then it would be a completely different being who thought it was the exact same being.

[Paqrat]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

To me all it sounds like your doing is replicating the thought of reincarnation but with science.

[devonin]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

To me it sounds like 3 days is not a week, so please stop posting.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its componant atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

That was not the question, at all. And your body was not reconstituted before the others were created, I didn't say that.

The problem is this: our atoms are swapped during our lifetime, therefore, it's not the individual atoms that define the person.

But, after your body was completely disintegrated, there's nothing else that connects you to those individual atoms. So, if I recreate your body several times, with the same composition and configuration, same thoughts and memories, will one of them actually be you?
Will you only be brought back if I recreate your body with the same individual atoms that formed your original body?

It's not just about bringing someone who feels like you and has your thoughts, it's about "you" coming back from the nothing and perceiving the world from one of those bodies. And it's not as simple as it seems.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

It seems incredibly obvious to me that if your body were completely reconstituted into its componant atoms, and you then created a body that was qualitatively identical to me, and then found some means by which to grant that body sentience, that it would share no memories, experiences or anything else with me, as I'm dead and it's a completely different being.

This.