Metaphysics, intelligence, God

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Because you aren't understanding the fallacy in your theory with it not being immaterial.

If it was physical then your idea of a soul doesn't make sense. How would it just jump around anywhere in the universe at the speed of light?

The observer is the brain that has specific memories. New memories is a different observer in the same perspective. New brain with the same memories is the same observer in the same perspective.

New brain with the same memories in a different body is the same observer in a different perspective. New brain with a new body is a different observer in a different perspective which is a completely different person.

Don't you realize that we're not talking about the same thing?

[Izzy]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

That is a terrible counter argument.

Your opinion is clearly more important to you then the truth. I see no reason to further explain anything to you.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

But that was NOT a counter argument.
We are talking about DIFFERENT THINGS.
It makes no sense to argue about something when we're not even talking about the same thing.
Don't you understand that? You have NO IDEA what I'm talking about.

You are saying things anyone says to a person when they disagree. You didn't even indicate a "fallacy" in my argument. At least MrRubix tries to see what I'm talking about.

Well, anyway, I said I would rest, for a while.

[Izzy]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

I don't think you do either. There is no need to make things more complicated then they really are.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Well, there’s a problem here. On the other post, you agreed with me that the atoms are changing all the time. It’s not what defines the observer.
You’re saying that if I create an identical brain, with the same atoms, you will live again and it will be really you. If I create an identical brain, but with different atoms, you will still be dead.
That’s the same as saying that the observer is in the atoms.
Don’t you think this is contradictory?

If I slowly swapped the atoms of your brain, one by one, in the end, it would still be the same observer in the brain. The observer wouldn’t be gone with the atoms, because I’m just doing the same thing that happens with you every three years or so, and your observer is still the same. It never left your body with the atoms.
If I picked the atoms that formed your brain before, which were exchanged, I could form a new, identical MrRubix brain and I assure you it would not be you.

Ahhhh, okay, I see what point you're trying to make here. It's actually a good question, although I still maintain that you are addressing things that CAN be answered with current postulations, despite your earlier statements. I'll try to be as clear as I can.

Yes, we maintain our same perspective even when atoms swap out. This is because what defines our perspective are the material components. If I replace one working part with an identical working part, I won't notice any difference. And so you're asking, "Well, how come then, if our parts are being replaced, we maintain the same perspective? Why can't we replace all atoms at once theoretically? Isn't this the same as removing your brain and replacing it with another one of identical composition? How can we say we maintain the same perspective if we're replacing things, and yet you say if you replace an entire brain, you're losing your perspective?"
(Let me know if I have interpreted you correctly)

If so, though, this is a PERFECTLY valid question worth addressing.

If you took all the atoms swapped out and created another Rubix, you'd have another Rubix with a different perspective. You could also extract certain material components from vegetables, noodles, eggs, meat, sugars, starches, grains, dairy, water, etc, and also create another Rubix. You can create any human from these elements because that is how humans are formed. We get our energy from food. We can theoretically create whatever we want with atoms.

This is all pretty obvious, so obviously the swapping of atoms alone isn't what determines our perspective. If we have part A, part B, part C, etc, all in place in the brain, then we have "MrRubix's perspective" -- it doesn't matter what A or B or C is made of. But, it's not like we're swapping out atoms to make another Rubix; we're just replacing certain parts slowly over time. I think we can agree on this point, that we could indeed make another Rubix with a different perspective if we used the swapped out atoms as our source, much like how we could use already-external atoms to make another Rubix instead of using those atoms to swap with my current parts.

After a certain age, we possess practically none of the same parts we had when we were younger. We've been generating new cells constantly and replacing the old with the new. So are we the same person? Are we constantly dying and simply transferring memories from one state to the next, giving us the illusion of a continuous existence? What, then, does it mean to die or stop perceiving? What is the defining moment that we end our point as an observer?

Our perspective IS the brain, and our bodies are merely the external vessels. If I moved my brain to a different body, I'd feel a continuous experience from MrRubix to that new body, still feeling like "MrRubix." I feel a continuous experience even if all the atoms in my brain swap out. So what's the difference between swapping my brain out into the world via atoms and replacing my brain with a different one?

I think the defining difference here is life versus death. There is a difference between replacing parts all at once and slowly over time. If I removed my brain by cutting it from my head, I would certainly no longer be experiencing -- I'd be dead! If I put in an identical brain, then that new brain would be feeling the "observation." But it's not like my "perception" from my old brain exists anymore. That MrRubix is dead. The new brain takes over the role as "perceiver/observer."

But if we replace things bit by bit, we can do so and still be alive with the "same brain." All of our parts are replacing in such a way that the initial functionings are not disturbed, and thus I maintain my perception.

We can "postulate" this with the same proof I've used in this thread.

Theoretically, we could create a direct clone of a human being with all the same memories, remove brain A, insert brain B, show Mr.Body-A-Brain-B something (like an apple), reinsert brain B into original body, reinsert brain A, and then ask if brain A still remembers the apple. Clearly, brain A was not exposed to the apple because it was not experiencing anything without the body. It was technically dead and not functioning in any way altogether.

But if we take that analogy to the atomic level where we say "brain A" is the original brain and "brain B" represents the atoms being swapped in to replace brain A, we'd say both brains are technically one in the same and part of the same continuous existence and perspective. This is because the functionality is consistent and uninterrupted across all scenarios. The MOMENT we disconnect our brains from its full-functionality and stop perceiving altogether, we are dead. The only way we'd live again is to bring that brain back to life. But we can replace parts of our brain without killing ourselves.

When you're dealing with continuous functionality, you have a continuous entity (life being replaced with life).
When you're dealing with discrete functionality, you have a discrete entity (e.g. life versus death)

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

I couldn't resist. I had to come back to answer...

When you're dealing with continuous functionality, you have a continuous entity (life being replaced with life).
When you're dealing with discrete functionality, you have a discrete entity (e.g. life versus death)

Yes, you interpreted it correctly. That was also a good answer.

But when you talk about a continuous entity, all I can imagine is that what maintains the fixed perspective in a brain is the fact that it is constantly receiving information from the body. Is that what you think?

In this case, we still need to think about the death issue. According from one of the answers in the other reply, you believe that, if someone desintegrates your brain, the only way to bring you back from the void is recreating the exact same brain with the same matter.
It looks like, theoretically, your observer was "frozen" in time when I killed your brain, and it's only coming back if I generate the exact conditions of the brain before the instant when it was killed. It’s as if I can wait a billion years to pick the same atoms and create the same brain, and it will still bring you back. In life, however, the observer “carries on”, it isn’t frozen. If I pick your current brain, and your brain ten years from now, we can agree that they are in completely different states, and that the perspective from the first brain is still in the second brain.

This will be a bit farfetched, but, think about it: according to this, if I pick the matter of your brain and recreate it with a single atom of difference, you’ll still be in the void, and the brain will have a new observer, just because of that tiny difference. Creating the same brain, you will wake up from a “dreamless sleep” and start feeling and seeing things again, and, in any other case, you will feel nothing, while the brain feels everything. If this is true, MrRubix, there’s no way we can imagine this situation without eternally connecting the frozen observer with the pre-death state of the brain with some sort of line that restricts the perspective to that state of brain. However, how can there be such connection if the observer is actually nonexistent, in the first place?

And, very important question: If, again, I pick the same atoms from your brain and create a brain with different configuration, it will have another observer, and you will still be in the void. However, if, during the lifetime of the new brain, I slowly change it until it has become your brain, the pre-death state, same atoms and stuff, what will happen now: The observer living in that brain will disappear and feel nothing forever, and your observer will awaken and emerge from it? Both observers will exist at once? What do you think?

Well… That’s a tricky issue. A clash between the continuity of the perspective in life, which carries on with the changes of the brain, and the discretion of the replacement of a dead brain with exactly the same brain, in the same question.



Okay, now, I’ll post the second thought experiment.



2. This one is about qualia, and it’s even mentioned in the Wikipedia’s qualia page, but not very specifically. It actually requires more abstraction capacity than the first one.
When you look into a person’s brain, you see neurons, electric signals and stuff. You don’t find any “colors” or “sounds”, obviously. The neurotransmissions that come from each sensorial organ is made of the exact same essence, the same matter: protons, neutrons and electrons. In a specific part of the brain, certain things happen and these signals become qualia.
However, consider a color: it’s a “bidimensional” feeling in a screen in our mind. It doesn’t have mass. It doesn’ have an “absolute” size. It’s completely imaginary, and exists only for the observer in the brain. It’s a completely different essence from the matter that we see in the brain.
I’m pretty sure that the particles in the neurotransmissions don’t cease to exist when the qualia are created, so they obviously don’t “become” the qualia. Whatever reactions happen in the brain will only generate more matter, which can be seen and measured by another person

Now, there’s another problem. Consider “sounds”. Sounds are also different from colors. There’s absolutely nothing in common between them. There are people who can “hear” with their eyes, but that’s a different thing. It only indicates that the same information can be shown with different qualia.
This first question is simple: How does the matter, a unique essence in its own, generate other essences which are completely different?

I’d ask you not to treat it as something obvious, because, if it were obvious, there wouldn’t be such a fuss among the philosophers when they talk about this.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Yes, I do think that as long as our inner sentience is functional -- as long as our brain is active -- we maintain our perspective as long as we are alive, even if we're swapping out parts for identical parts slowly over time.

It looks like, theoretically, your observer was "frozen" in time when I killed your brain, and it's only coming back if I generate the exact conditions of the brain before the instant when it was killed. It’s as if I can wait a billion years to pick the same atoms and create the same brain, and it will still bring you back. In life, however, the observer “carries on”, it isn’t frozen. If I pick your current brain, and your brain ten years from now, we can agree that they are in completely different states, and that the perspective from the first brain is still in the second brain.

I would agree.

This will be a bit farfetched, but, think about it: according to this, if I pick the matter of your brain and recreate it with a single atom of difference, you’ll still be in the void, and the brain will have a new observer, just because of that tiny difference. Creating the same brain, you will wake up from a “dreamless sleep” and start feeling and seeing things again, and, in any other case, you will feel nothing, while the brain feels everything. If this is true, MrRubix, there’s no way we can imagine this situation without eternally connecting the frozen observer with the pre-death state of the brain with some sort of line that restricts the perspective to that state of brain. However, how can there be such connection if the observer is actually nonexistent, in the first place?

Hopefully I understood you here.

I don't think one atom difference will mean anything. If I recreate the destroyed brain with the same atoms and bring it back to life, it'll be the same brain, same perspective. Even if there's one atom difference, that won't fundamentally change anything at all because no functionality is entirely dependent on one atom in the brain -- a given functionality is made up of several atoms. It'll be the same perspective.

If I've misunderstood you here, please let me know.

And, very important question: If, again, I pick the same atoms from your brain and create a brain with different configuration, it will have another observer, and you will still be in the void. However, if, during the lifetime of the new brain, I slowly change it until it has become your brain, the pre-death state, same atoms and stuff, what will happen now: The observer living in that brain will disappear and feel nothing forever, and your observer will awaken and emerge from it? Both observers will exist at once? What do you think?

Well… That’s a tricky issue. A clash between the continuity of the perspective in life, which carries on with the changes of the brain, and the discretion of the replacement of a dead brain with exactly the same brain, in the same question.

Well, if you took a brain and restructured it to resemble a different brain, the original observer would be different than it was before, and it would depend on what you changed. If you simply changed the structure of it to have different memories/etc, then it would follow suit, of course. It should still experience a continuous "perspective/life," although it would have become a different perspective with the different configuration. It would experience, in the same mind, growing up as person X and then being reconfigured into person Y (depending on what you changed).

Recreating the brain to resemble someone who was previously dead (say if we kill person Y, and then change person X's brain into person Y's brain) won't "bring back the original perspective" if that person's brain is dead, even if you're creating a perfect replica.

Again, if I've misunderstood, let me know.

It may help to use different vocabulary. When you say "pick the atoms/pick the matter of your brain," that feels ambiguous to me. Let me know if you are using new atoms to copy a pre-existing brain, or the same atoms, or if you are destroying/removing something, etc. Being very specific will make it easier to understand your thought experiments.

2. This one is about qualia, and it’s even mentioned in the Wikipedia’s qualia page, but not very specifically. It actually requires more abstraction capacity than the first one.
When you look into a person’s brain, you see neurons, electric signals and stuff. You don’t find any “colors” or “sounds”, obviously. The neurotransmissions that come from each sensorial organ is made of the exact same essence, the same matter: protons, neutrons and electrons. In a specific part of the brain, certain things happen and these signals become qualia.

Yep yep yep, agreed.

However, consider a color: it’s a “bidimensional” feeling in a screen in our mind. It doesn’t have mass. It doesn’ have an “absolute” size. It’s completely imaginary, and exists only for the observer in the brain. It’s a completely different essence from the matter that we see in the brain.

Yes, agreed so far (disclaimer: I do not know much about specific workings of specific areas of the brain beyond a few introductory Psych courses; Reach would know about this more than I would since I believe he studied this stuff in college as a major, but as far as I know, what you're saying so far is accurate). I'd actually love to hear what Reach has to say about this. I do not specifically know how our brain interprets memory/our visuals/what we "imagine" and what is actually occurring physically and how our brain is able to create this notion of "translating" this physical-level activity into an "image" our mind can "see."

I’m pretty sure that the particles in the neurotransmissions don’t cease to exist when the qualia are created, so they obviously don’t “become” the qualia. Whatever reactions happen in the brain will only generate more matter, which can be seen and measured by another person

Now, there’s another problem. Consider “sounds”. Sounds are also different from colors. There’s absolutely nothing in common between them. There are people who can “hear” with their eyes, but that’s a different thing. It only indicates that the same information can be shown with different qualia.
This first question is simple: How does the matter, a unique essence in its own, generate other essences which are completely different?

I’d ask you not to treat it as something obvious, because, if it were obvious, there wouldn’t be such a fuss among the philosophers when they talk about this.

People cannot "hear" with their eyes per se, but your brain has a lot of awesome auto-calibration stuff going down. Your brain uses your eyes and ears together to help determine where a sound is coming from. This is a function of distance between each ear and the sound source and its intensity, and this is somewhat "automatically calculated" in conjunction with your eyes, but in general we are only able to judge the azimuth (that is, a general vicinity/small angle sweep where the sound originates, and to some extent elevation, and not so much distance).

This is how I can play music on my speakers and be able to look at the speakers themselves and "tell" that the sound is coming from that specific area.

Anyways, slight tangent there. I would say that all of our senses are the result of interpreted electrical signals. A physical object gives off light/photons, which angles its way through our pupils (which focus the light) and onto a small postage-stamp-sized area of tissue with a bunch of receptors (rods and cones for brightness/color), which sends a constant stream of electrical-level data to certain areas of our brain (the primary visual cortex in the occipital lobe and some other area in the parietal lobe) to be processed. As far as I know, we don't really know HOW these things are processed, but Reach may have a better answer than I do, here.

In any case, to answer your question, we are able to sense our environment around us because our sensory organs are equipped to pick up various bits of information that is given off (light, waves, pressure, etc). Based on these interactions, our body responds by "translating" these interactions into electrical signals that are interpreted by our brain so that we can experience what is going on around us. We see an "essence" (matter/light/information) generating another "essence" (qualia) as a result of the way our brains function -- again, I don't know specifically how the signals are processed. But what is important is that the information (in all its various forms) interacts with our sensory organs, and it is those reactions that generate the framework that we interpret as our "observational experience."

The brain really is an awesome thing. :P

I feel like the answer to this question is fairly simple and obvious, so again, let me know if I am misinterpreting you.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Recreating the brain to resemble someone who was previously dead (say if we kill person Y, and then change person X's brain into person Y's brain) won't "bring back the original perspective" if that person's brain is dead, even if you're creating a perfect replica.

Again, if I've misunderstood, let me know.

It may help to use different vocabulary. When you say "pick the atoms/pick the matter of your brain," that feels ambiguous to me. Let me know if you are using new atoms to copy a pre-existing brain, or the same atoms, or if you are destroying/removing something, etc. Being very specific will make it easier to understand your thought experiments.

Alright, I'll try to be more specific.

First, let me point some of the things you said you believed, in this thought experiment:

(1) A few posts ago, you said that if I pick exactly the same atoms from your desintegrated brain and recreate it exactly the way it was before it was desintegrated, it would bring you back, because it's the same brain. That means that you would wake up from the nothingness to start experiencing things again. For a materialist, this makes perfect sense.

(2) We also agreed that, during the lifetime, the brain changes but the perspective remains the same. Slowly changing the atoms will still maintain the perspective. There's evidence that the atoms are exchanged.

(3) You said that creating a different brain will not bring a dead person back, since it's just a replica.

The problem is the following:

As you know, your brain was desintegrated. You are now experiencing nothing.
Now, I select a living person's brain, somewhere in the world.
I will now slowly exchange the atoms and change the configuration of this person's brain. You are still experiencing nothing, while the person is living normally, but with a brain that's slowly changing.
However, I will change the person's brain and entire nervous system until it has been replaced with all the very same atoms from your original brain, and with the same configuration, too.

The person's brain has become your brain. The same brain, not a replica.

Considering (1), it's only natural to assume that you will wake up from the nothingness, since your exact brain was recreated. However, if we consider (2), the person's original observer should have remained the same, as well.
But then, again, the person's observer was alive the whole time, while your observer was nonexistent. You were feeling nothing, you weren't the other person. What happens?

There is clearly a paradox, here.

Everything that was assumed in the course of this thought experiment was based on the postulation that the observer depends on the brain, and on physical facts based on evidences, like the fact that our atoms are exchanged several times in our life.

Can 2 observers exist simultanoeusly, on the same brain? Well, that goes against the belief that the observer is the brain itself. One brain <=> one observer, according to you.
Will your observer not be brought back? Well, it is the same brain that came back. If it doesn't come back, then, again, observer and brain are not the same.
Will the 2 observers "converge" into one? Well, let's see this: a nonexistent observer would reappear in the same brain of a previously existent observer. The nonexistent one would "become" the existent one, having all of it's experiences. To illustrate how absurd this is, I could simply say that I can summon every single "dead" observer, one by one, by making the same procedure with their dead brain's atoms, in a single brain.

Assuming that the observer depends on the brain and assuming that the observer is carried on during lifetime can be led into situations like this. This is reduction to the absurd, and this is one of my reasons.

Since I've thought a lot about this issue, I eventually found these weird situations by myself.

MrRubix, please, analyse this situation carefully. I can only see 2 ways of solving this paradox: Either assuming that the assumption that our atoms and brain configuration change during our life is a lie, or questioning the postulation that the observer depends entirely on the physical brain to exist. There is direct evidence for the first one.

If you don't really think that there is a paradox, then, please, show me. All I'm doing is considering everything we agreed so far. I am not interested in lying to myself or other people.

People cannot "hear" with their eyes per se, but your brain has a lot of awesome auto-calibration stuff going down. Your brain uses your eyes and ears together to help determine where a sound is coming from. This is a function of distance between each ear and the sound source and its intensity, and this is somewhat "automatically calculated" in conjunction with your eyes, but in general we are only able to judge the azimuth (that is, a general vicinity/small angle sweep where the sound originates, and to some extent elevation, and not so much distance).

Well, of course you know that there is something called synesthesia. That's what I was talking about.

The brain really is an awesome thing. :P

Indeed.

I feel like the answer to this question is fairly simple and obvious, so again, let me know if I am misinterpreting you.

It is very easy to answer that the brain "processes" electric signals and create qualia. It is too easy, but doesn't explain anything. And that was the question: "how" the brain does that.

This can only be analysed subjectively, since we can't see qualia on the brain of others. Look at the colors on the screen, and think. Try to relate them with particles and chemical reactions. Think about happiness, too. That's all there is to it: thinking.

I am not going to address any "maybes" here, because I don't want to annoy you. But, to me, they feel like complete different essences. They are obviously related to what the physical brain perceives, but that doesn't explain why they are the way they are.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Wait so you're asking what happens if I change person Y's brain slowly into person X's (given person X is dead) using person X's atoms while person Y is still alive?

For simplicity's sake, let's say person Y was knocked out so they are alive but not making new memories at the time we start swapping out atoms. As we previously discussed, the swapping of atoms does not nuke our perspectives. And so it is the same as if we simply replaced all the atoms and then changed the brain's structure through some sort of sculpting process on an atomic level such that we now have person X's brain structure, and all while person Y is alive.

I would say it feels like person X came back to life. It's technically his brain -- technically no different from a mere swap. So, what about person Y? Well, even though he may have maintained his "person Y" perspective despite having all atoms replaced by person X's, person Y ceased to exist the moment we changed the fundamental structure to resemble person X's -- his memories, his consciousness, everything -- is no longer there. It may be a "change" from Y to X, but we are technically eliminating Y. The body itself feels a continuous experience, but the moment we change the fundamental configuration of the brain, we gain a new perspective. It is a sort of "paradox" but at the same time it isn't (A PARADOXICAL PARADOX WHAT THE FFUU). A paradox only truly exists if something's in a state of contradiction, but I don't think that's what we have here. Even though person X may feel as though he were resurrected, person Y still feels a continuous perspective even though it completely changes for him and removes his SPECIFIC perspective. It's "like" saying that we're taking two "perspectives" and replacing them with "one perspective" but only to the EXTENT that the brain itself was always alive.

In my opinion, a very good/interesting question!

Regarding your last question, again, I have no idea how the brain does that. I'm actually not sure if science knows the answer to that fully yet, either.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Well, I see a paradox when I try to see the two perspectives at once.
One of the perspectives will feel "continuous", but with changing thoughts, memories and stuff.
The other will be nonexistent during the whole time that the other is changing.

We can try to make a parallel between the two perspectives. "You" will feel like you've been gone for a second or so, but will wake up in the other body, in the future.

Try to see this question without the "simplicity" you created. It's a slow, continuous change, and maybe person Y will be awake several times during this process.

The problem is that, when you say that person Y's perspective will disappear in the moment person X's body is recreated, it's technically a denial of (2) from the other post. Forget about the "thoughts and memories", for a second, and think only about the observer. Try drawing a timeline with the two observers in a paper or something.
One second before the change is complete, observer X is still feeling nothing. And it will awaken from the nothing in the moment the change is complete, only when the atoms were reorganized into making his brain.

Try looking from X's perspective.

When X awakens, I can't help but imagine that the universe "recorded" his brain in case someone wanted to bring him back, which doesn't make sense. And, again, how many different states a brain can have for the same observer? Well, infinite.
Yet, again, that observer will only come back with the exact same brain of the moment of his death.

Think: I could change Y's brain into the state X's brain was two seconds before X's brain was desintegrated. It's not exactly the same, so, even though Y will now have X's mind from 2 seconds before X's death, X will definitely not be brought back from the void. It will still feel "nothing" while Y has thoughts from a specific state of X's brain.

What if X didn't really have his brain desintegrated? Even if I changed Y's brain into the same state X's brain would be if it were desintegrated, even with the same atoms of X's brain in that moment, X's observer will obviously move forward in his original body.

There are just too many situations I can think. It's just moving the paradox to somewhere else.

Do you get the "magical recording" thing? What is it that restricts a "dead" observer to a specific state of brain, materially speaking?

If the observer was just purely dependent on the brain, we could say that any observer could be called any time, because every configuration would be connected to a single observer. But that's not the case. There are several configurations for a single observer.

And that's why I think that the observer is something else: Something that is connected to the many states of a brain, but not necessarily limited by them. I can actually imagine that.



I don't think I can give you the same feeling of "absurd" I have when I think about these situations. Words have limits, of course.



But, anyway, do you think that a revision of the postulations is something worth considering?



Well, even if you don't, I hope you no longer think that I'm an ignorant person (if I gave you that impression before).




Off topic: I'm writing a science fiction book. It's weird for me to mention it now, but I just felt like saying it. It's about people who discover mysteries of existence and gain powers. There's a lot of philosophy involved.
There is this character, his name is "Mark". During a big part of the story, he's the smartest and most powerful. It's funny, because, when I created him, I didn't even know your name. So, when I saw people calling you Marcus, it was kinda scary :P
Well, Mark is a common name.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

I made the situation "simple" because to make it more complicated adds nothing -- even if person Y were awake, the perspective changes during the entire transformation process. If we're assuming that we're phasing out Y-specific memory to X memory + (X+Y) memories, then all that matters is the phasing out of the processing/consciousness -- so whether or not someone is awake or asleep is irrelevant, here.

Why are you assuming that X "reappears" as a very sudden thing the moment before X is fully formed? A perspective, again, is the result of physical composition -- the atoms are irrelevant. It doesn't necessarily have to be the same atoms -- what matter is that you're not using a separate replica.

(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

This scenario is DIFFERENT from if we had brain X chilling there, composed of X1-specific atoms, and another identical brain made of X2-specific atoms -- and we brought back the brain made up of X2-specific atoms immediately after we kill person X, whose brain is made of X1-specific atoms. Even though in both scenarios we are bringing back a brain that is made up of X2-specific atoms, we're not bringing back the same person. In this case, we can't say the two scenarios are even comparable: the X2 atoms in the first scenario are different from the X2 atoms in the second scenario. The origins are completely different -- the X1 atoms we bring back in the second scenario are part of a separate process, and the X1 atoms we bring back in the first scenario is part of a swapped-in process.

So, the atoms themselves do NOT matter -- what does matter is purely the presence of the given PARTS and whether or not those same parts are being used. The moment we deviate from this into a "what if we use these separate atoms" thought scenario, we violate this postulation DIRECTLY since we are confounding the concept of a function having an origin regarding its composition. This is technically what is meant by a "continuous" versus "discrete" case -- we can be more accurate by saying that it's the FUNCTION that needs to be present -- its composition is its own regardless of what swaps in or out. As long as the part is there, that is its part. So we can IGNORE atoms and maintain the SAME level of truth and this will make things a bit easier for us to understand.

If we destroy X's brain and then simply use those atoms to swap in with Y's brain, and then change Y's brain to resemble X's brain, what we're really doing is changing X's brain to look like Y's, swapping it into Y's head, and then changing it to resemble X again. Or, if we don't want a gradual "shift," we can just remove Y's brain and insert X's. The outcomes are the same -- X will regain his perspective, either way. In the first case, we're not 'swapping' X for Y, but rather removing Y and replacing it with the X parts altogether. It may be confusing because we're saying "well, we're using X atoms," but really we're "using X's parts." Y loses his perspective in the first case because we are phasing it out (again, even though the brain is alive, we're inserting X's brain), and in the second case, we're just removing the brain. In either case, the outcome is consistent with the notion that perspective is defined by the physical components being used.

The fact that the brain is alive is the only extent to which we say Y's perspective is a continuous one, even though he technically ceases to exist the moment we change the brain to X's. Again, this is only confusing if you're trying to impose a "soul" concept or some sort of mind-external entity. The examples we've been bringing up can be completely explained (and are consistent) with the physical argument.

It would be like fully understanding how a computer works (which we do, since humans created computers) but wondering how its soul fits in. We don't need a "soul" concept to explain a computer -- it only adds a layer of additional complexity that is almost impossible to explain such that it remains consistent with what we DO know. Likewise for humans -- it may be "easy" to "assume" that we have a soul, but it's actually MUCH more complicated to actually incorporate it into the proof of what we do know (either because it directly contradicts things or provides no new information altogether). As can be seen here, we can explain everything about human perspective with a physical argument that is not only consistent, but has no need for a soul. To invoke a soul here would be to add a layer of complexity that will keep you up all night wondering things you will never be able to prove or understand. The physical argument is complex enough to understand! It's enough to explain all questions raised so far. Do you see what I mean when I say "a soul isn't needed"? If there were a need for a soul, then we should be able to come up with a question that directly contradicts the physical argument and demands the need for an external entity of existence. However, since perspective IS defined by physical components, it's going to be impossible to throw in the notion of a soul on top of it.

Again, sorry if that was hard to understand -- unlike an essay, these forum posts are entirely stream-of-thought and without any self-editing, lol. I'll re-explain something if I did so insufficiently.



EDIT But to answer your final question: It's always worth reconsidering a postulation if there's a reason to. However, so far we have no real reason to. We can explain things sufficiently with current postulations.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Yet, again, that observer will only come back with the exact same brain of the moment of his death.
...
Do you get the "magical recording" thing? What is it that restricts a "dead" observer to a specific state of brain, materially speaking?

If the observer was just purely dependent on the brain, we could say that any observer could be called any time, because every configuration would be connected to a single observer. But that's not the case. There are several configurations for a single observer.

And that's why I think that the observer is something else: Something that is connected to the many states of a brain, but not necessarily limited by them. I can actually imagine that.

I can see how this notion is tough to put into words. I can assure you though that approaching it physically makes everything so much easier to grasp (that, and we can answer any question with the physical postulation).

Observer X will be brought back if we bring back X's brain. We can change the brain theoretically to resemble whatever we want it to -- as a brain, it'll keep perceiving and functioning as long as it's a working brain. Of course, the sense of "who's at the helm" depends on how that specific brain is structured.

Let me pose to you another scenario that may make things easier to understand what exactly it means to be an observer bound by the brain.

Consider people who end up with certain extreme types of seizures and need to have half their brains removed (assuming a mere severing of the corpus calossum is insufficient). They still retain their perspective/consciousness/sentience, regardless of which half I remove. Despite the somewhat functionalist arguments debated in this thread, we can say that self-identity and perspective is maintained in either side of the brain (even based on empirical findings -- even if we lose certain functions if we remove a given half). We have people living with only their left halves, and we have people living with only their right halves. And yet, they are still observers with the same sense of perspective and identity.

And so, if each side of the brain is home to processes that give us our perspective/identity/sentience, what would happen if we split a guy's brain (say, me) in two and were able to plant each half in two new bodies? Well, we'd have two people now, and yet they'd have a shared origin. However, they are now technically separate people -- only, as we've always said, their perspective is defined by the physical functions. The person with the left brain retains left-brain functions (plus any natural rewirings depending on age) and the sense of "I am MrRubix," and the person with the right half of the brain retains right-brain functions (also plus any natural rewirings depending on age) and the sense of "I am MrRubix." Again, even though I have technically severed myself in two from a unified, shared perspective, I have now split that perspective such that I am now living two, separate lives.

So what if I wake up and find myself the MrRubix with the left brain? "I am indeed MrRubix, but why didn't I wake up as the right-brained MrRubix?" This is because that body has the left brain. Therefore that perspective is defined by the left brain. Likewise with the right brained MrRubix. He's wondering why he didn't wake up as the left. But, in both cases, they wake up the people that they are because of the physical components that define them, even if they have a continuous existence.

So what are we really saying? When we have both halves of our brain in one body, we could also argue that this is the same as having two separate self-sustaining entities and possible observer sources working together in one body. If you want an "easy explanation," it's like saying we have two observers in one body -- only they are technically working together as one cohesive observer.

We can also remove additional parts from a half-brain and still retain perspective (although we lose more and more functionality) -- as long as we don't remove the parts that are essential for self-identity, or rather the parts that are integral in the processing of memory or sensory data. Whatever part of the brain is kept alive is kept perceiving, no matter where it is.

Similarly, if we could remove half a brain from two people and swap those halves, then those people would wake up with a shared sense of perception/sentience/identity assuming we could wire them together cohesively.

Again, our status as an observer depends entirely on the parts that compose us.

[mhss1992]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

Why are you assuming that X "reappears" as a very sudden thing the moment before X is fully formed? A perspective, again, is the result of physical composition -- the atoms are irrelevant. It doesn't necessarily have to be the same atoms -- what matter is that you're not using a separate replica.

Well, we have a problem (again).

On my second post of this thought experiment, I asked:
"If I recreate your brain with the very same atoms that formed it when it was disintegrated, will it bring you back?"

You did say "yes".

But then I asked, later:
"What if I recreate your brain with different atoms (different individual atoms, but same composition, in case it wasn't clear), but the very same configuration? Will it bring you back?"

You said "No, because it’s Just a replica."

Well, now you're saying that the individual atoms don't matter (which I agree. I actually said in the very first post of this thought experiment that atoms don't have their own "perspective", they don't really matter in this situation), what matters is the composition.

I'm afraid you just moved the paradox to somewhere else.

If the individual atoms don't matter, there is nothing that stops me from creating many brains with the same material composition and configuration. In the end, you're just saying that an absolutely perfect replica still works as the same brain.

Because, well, if I can recreate your brain with the same composition, theoretically, there's no limit to how many times I can do that.

That means that many brains can wake up and have your memories and thoughts. Many brains can feel exactly like you.

But that doesn't mean that *you*, the person who died and stopped experiencing things, will actually feel that you woke up in one of those brains. Do you see the difference? (I remember that you said this option was actually bogus BS, but I can see how your own words eventually lead to it)

What happens? Will you still be in the void while there are many identical MrRubix brains around the world?
Will you reappear in one specific brain?

I guess you know what each answer means.

(Damn, another thought experiment coming up):

For example: Let's say we remove brain X and let it sit for a long time. Brain X, at time of death, is made of X1-specific atoms (arbitrary name). Say we leave that brain be for years and years until all the X1-specific atoms swap out for X2-specific atoms (a completely new set of atoms). Then we bring back that brain. X will regain his perspective even though all the atoms are different.

Exactly. And you just strengthened my points with the paradox.

This scenario is DIFFERENT from if we had brain X chilling there, composed of X1-specific atoms, and another identical brain made of X2-specific atoms -- and we brought back the brain made up of X2-specific atoms immediately after we kill person X, whose brain is made of X1-specific atoms. Even though in both scenarios we are bringing back a brain that is made up of X2-specific atoms, we're not bringing back the same person. In this case, we can't say the two scenarios are even comparable: the X2 atoms in the first scenario are different from the X2 atoms in the second scenario. The origins are completely different -- the X1 atoms we bring back in the second scenario are part of a separate process, and the X1 atoms we bring back in the first scenario is part of a swapped-in process.

Yes. I guess it makes sense to think that the X observer was still in the X1-specific atoms brain, in this case.

But, still, this scenario doesn't solve the paradox I just mentioned, at all.

In fact, it worsens it:

If you can say, for sure, that the person X will not come back with the X2-atoms brain, because the perspective was in the X1-atoms brain, What will happen after I disintegrate(damn, I was spelling it wrong the whole time) the X1 brain?

Well, once disintegrated, there are no more “parts”. This is the problem, considering what can happen after those working parts no longer exist.

Considering this last situation you mentioned, I can also say, for sure, that the identical X2 brain will not bring the person back after X1 was gone. Neither will a X3, X4, ..., Xn identical brain.

But you did say, posts ago, that the person would come back with the X1-atoms brain.

That means that the observer is still connected to the specific atoms, somehow.

And that goes against what we've concluded: "specific atoms don't matter". In this case, they really weren’t supposed to matter, since there are no working parts.

But, still if we suppose that they are connected to specific atoms after death: A "nonexistent” thing cannot be connected to atoms. It doesn't make any sense. Therefore, the observer did not cease to exist.

Is the observer the atoms? No, it can't be. We know that. The brain swaps it's atoms all the time.

Okay, now you can say that "Even with the same atoms and same composition, that will still not bring the person back".

Well,



It's the same brain. The same atoms, configuration, thoughts, memories. The same everything. If the same person that died does not wake up from the void and start experiencing things again,


then,







OBSERVER AND BRAIN ARE NOT THE SAME.






… Do you see?
Every option will lead to either an absurd situation or the eventual denial of a previous proposition.

So, the atoms themselves do NOT matter -- what does matter is purely the presence of the given PARTS and whether or not those same parts are being used. The moment we deviate from this into a "what if we use these separate atoms" thought scenario, we violate this postulation DIRECTLY since we are confounding the concept of a function having an origin regarding its composition. This is technically what is meant by a "continuous" versus "discrete" case -- we can be more accurate by saying that it's the FUNCTION that needs to be present -- its composition is its own regardless of what swaps in or out. As long as the part is there, that is its part. So we can IGNORE atoms and maintain the SAME level of truth and this will make things a bit easier for us to understand.

Ok.
Again, once a brain was disintegrated, it will no longer have working parts.
What happens if I bring the first paradoxal situation in this reply?
If we can ignore atoms, that means I can create an endless number of identical brains. If none of these brains bring back the original observer, again, observer and brain are not the same.

…
It would be like fully understanding how a computer works (which we do, since humans created computers) but wondering how its soul fits in. We don't need a "soul" concept to explain a computer -- it only adds a layer of additional complexity that is almost impossible to explain such that it remains consistent with what we DO know. Likewise for humans -- it may be "easy" to "assume" that we have a soul, but it's actually MUCH more complicated to actually incorporate it into the proof of what we do know (either because it directly contradicts things or provides no new information altogether).

Sorry, Rubix, but I still find paradoxes.

I am not forcing paradoxal situations, I just naturally stumble upon them.

I can’t see how a “soul” directly contradicts anything that’s physically proven. Can you please give me an example?

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

"On my second post of this thought experiment, I asked:
"If I recreate your brain with the very same atoms that formed it when it was disintegrated, will it bring you back?"

You did say "yes".

But then I asked, later:
"What if I recreate your brain with different atoms (different individual atoms, but same composition, in case it wasn't clear), but the very same configuration? Will it bring you back?"

You said "No, because it’s Just a replica.""


In the first case I assume you mean that we're destroying a given brain and then simply resurrecting that same brain. This is no different from the second case you brought up -- if we bring back something that wasn't the original brain, then we're not bringing back the original observer. Apologies if that was unclear.

[MrRubix]

Re: Metaphysics, intelligence, God

"Well, now you're saying that the individual atoms don't matter (which I agree. I actually said in the very first post of this thought experiment that atoms don't have their own "perspective", they don't really matter in this situation), what matters is the composition.

I'm afraid you just moved the paradox to somewhere else.

If the individual atoms don't matter, there is nothing that stops me from creating many brains with the same material composition and configuration. In the end, you're just saying that an absolutely perfect replica still works as the same brain.

Because, well, if I can recreate your brain with the same composition, theoretically, there's no limit to how many times I can do that.

That means that many brains can wake up and have your memories and thoughts. Many brains can feel exactly like you.

But that doesn't mean that *you*, the person who died and stopped experiencing things, will actually feel that you woke up in one of those brains. Do you see the difference? (I remember that you said this option was actually bogus BS, but I can see how your own words eventually lead to it)

What happens? Will you still be in the void while there are many identical MrRubix brains around the world?
Will you reappear in one specific brain?

I guess you know what each answer means.
"



I didn't move the paradox anywhere -- I directly refuted your claim and resolved the paradox. If you recreate multiple replicas of my brain, then you are creating new brains with memories/etc, even though their personal perspectives were created as soon as you made a new brain. If I am simply being copied, then I of course maintain my own perspective. This doesn't clash against any BS claim I made earlier.

A replica is a replica. It isn't the same as the original.