In an effort to get a discussion going here at CT, I decided I'd post a short paper I wrote for my philosophy class. It's about the relationship between determinism and free will. The paper itself was my first draft; I did the second on campus, so I didn't end up saving it. Some of the points aren't completely fine tuned, and the last paragraph is horribly weak since I spent about two minutes on it.
Regardless. Rather than critiquing my paper, I hope it will spark a discussion. Articulate your viewpoint on the matter. What did you agree with, disagree with? Take a little time to understand the subject before posting. Anyways, here it is.
In reading this first paragraph, it’s suggested that the reader asks itself a few questions. First, is it truly free will that allowed one to read this paper? Secondly, was it either determined that one would read this paper? It’s expected that one will find itself thinking, “Of course I choose to read this paper, not anything else!” However, this may perhaps not be the case, from a philosophical perspective. Maybe it’s free will that is allowing it. Maybe it’s predetermined that one is to read this. Maybe it’s both. In this essay we’ll be exploring a large subject that numerous figures in philosophy have dealt with- determinism and free will. My thesis is simply to assert the notion of incompatibility as opposed to compatibility; why one should choose the former over the latter.
The most logical place to start then is to define compatibilism. It’s a perspective which claims that free will is compatible with determinism. The two are consistent with each other, and most compatibilists will go as far as to say that free will is dependant upon determinism (the other choice being indeterminism). But what does that mean, what are its implications? To understand that, we should explain determinism and free will.
Determinism is a proposition where every event in time is determined by prior actions that have taken place. This is translated in a few different views and variations. Theological determinism states that some god is determining all events. Logical determinism states that all claims about events, in any time, are either true or false. For the sake of this paper, we’ll be using nomological (casual) determinism. This states that past events in combination with the laws of nature necessitate all future events. As shown with Laplace’s famous demon, if you know everything that has happened, and all the laws of our universe, then you can theoretically predict whatever shall come to pass. What this means for us simple thinking things is that our actions are also determined. They are still meaningful, and perhaps even still conscious and deliberated, but still determined because of the past and the laws of nature. Whether or not this affects our free will is something that both compatibilists and incompatibilists try to answer.
Free will has been related in a number of ways. It’s perhaps the most daunting subject of the philosophical world, and certainly one of the most contested. What we will refer to it as is a commonly accepted form. Free will is the ability a thinking thing has to choose between alternatives- suggesting that whenever one of us is presented with multiple choices, we have the capability to decide upon one choice instead of the others. One could stop reading the paper here, or one could continue reading. Free will would state that one continued reading because one had the alternative of not reading on, but decided to act on the other choice of continuation. Moral responsibility is tied directly to free will. When we possess the freedom of our actions, it follows that we can be held responsible for our actions. Likewise, without free will, it is impossible for us to be held responsible for our actions.
We can now come back to compatibilism. It’s first assumed, for a compatibilist vantage, that determinism is true. Next, it’s assumed that within this deterministic world, free will also maintains to be true. At first glance this may appear to be a contradiction, but it isn’t. Not surprisingly, it depends on how you interpret free will. Hume, for example, provides that free will isn’t the ability to make a different choice under the exact same circumstances. Rather, it’s the (hypothetical) ability to make a different choice under different circumstances. When one continues to read this paper, we aren’t asserting that one choose to read over not reading. We assert that the desire to read caused it to continue. Had the desire been different, the choice made would also be different. With these conditions, compatibilism seems to work.
Now that it’s understood what compatibilism is, we can begin to discuss against its case. What we’re arguing for is just the opposite of compatibility. We’re arguing for incompatibility. Free will is incompatible with determinism. Meaning that free will is true and determinism is false (libertarianism), or that free will is false and determinism is true (hard determinism). Adhering to this incompatibility are a few staple arguments that we will assume to.
Our first argument is known as the intuition pump. Let’s suppose that determinism is true (a necessary condition for compatibilism). Determinism states that the past, in combination with the laws of nature, determines what our actions will turn out to be. What that tells us is, in a sense, we are no different from that of a robot. Each one of our actions is casually determined, just like the programming in a robot. We are determined to act a certain way because of this. Furthermore, we have only one way, a way in which we have no control over- just like a robot. We’re simply reacting as we’re programmed to act. When certain conditions are given to a person, the person is guaranteed to act a certain way. The laws of nature dictate our conduct. All we are are just greatly advanced robots, that aren’t fully understood (yet; otherwise, we’d be like Laplace’s demon). This lack of free will is potentially one consequence of a determinist viewpoint, as this example above shows.
The next argument is in regards to causation. Again, we’ll suppose that determinism is true. A criminal acts out against another person, shooting him in the face, killing him. In this, it is possible to state that the criminal cannot be held responsible for his action (an outrageous claim from an ethical standpoint). Yes, it was he that did it, but he isn’t necessarily the primary cause for his action. Since determinism explains that our actions, as well as ourselves, are the products of past events, it follows that we can only be held accountable for the actions- not responsible. This is because the causation of these actions doesn’t originate within us. The criminal’s desire to pull the trigger was caused by his current mental state, which was caused maybe by an unstable situation, which stemmed from the two seeing each other on that day, and so forth, all the way back to the criminal’s birth. Once again, we find that a consequence of determinism is the lack of free will.
Last is an argument that was hinted at in the previous two- the consequence argument. A normal, thinking thing cannot possibly have control over the past, or over the laws of nature. This is true for any viewpoint. If determinism holds true, and we are the products of the past and the laws of nature, then we can’t possibly be held responsible for the consequences of either. We don’t have control over any of the consequences from the past or the laws of nature, and for ourselves, as we are also consequences of these. For every action that we do, it is the only action that we could’ve done at that time. If we do otherwise (even hypothetically), then we’re either creating or contradiction, or changing either the past of the laws of nature. One continues reading this because that is the only choice that exists. To have done anything else would mean one of the following: something in the past changed that lead to the cause of this, a law of nature was changed that allowed this, or a contradiction, a logical fallacy, has arisen. This argument renders us in a world where, when determinism is true, free will can’t possibly be true.
Hopefully I’ve demonstrated why an incompatibilist viewpoint is preferable to a compatibilist one. Whether you choose to be a libertarian, or are destined to be a hard determinist, or any incompatibilist philosophy for that I matter, is entirely your action. I can’t decide for you, but only share my perspective.
Regardless. Rather than critiquing my paper, I hope it will spark a discussion. Articulate your viewpoint on the matter. What did you agree with, disagree with? Take a little time to understand the subject before posting. Anyways, here it is.
In reading this first paragraph, it’s suggested that the reader asks itself a few questions. First, is it truly free will that allowed one to read this paper? Secondly, was it either determined that one would read this paper? It’s expected that one will find itself thinking, “Of course I choose to read this paper, not anything else!” However, this may perhaps not be the case, from a philosophical perspective. Maybe it’s free will that is allowing it. Maybe it’s predetermined that one is to read this. Maybe it’s both. In this essay we’ll be exploring a large subject that numerous figures in philosophy have dealt with- determinism and free will. My thesis is simply to assert the notion of incompatibility as opposed to compatibility; why one should choose the former over the latter.
The most logical place to start then is to define compatibilism. It’s a perspective which claims that free will is compatible with determinism. The two are consistent with each other, and most compatibilists will go as far as to say that free will is dependant upon determinism (the other choice being indeterminism). But what does that mean, what are its implications? To understand that, we should explain determinism and free will.
Determinism is a proposition where every event in time is determined by prior actions that have taken place. This is translated in a few different views and variations. Theological determinism states that some god is determining all events. Logical determinism states that all claims about events, in any time, are either true or false. For the sake of this paper, we’ll be using nomological (casual) determinism. This states that past events in combination with the laws of nature necessitate all future events. As shown with Laplace’s famous demon, if you know everything that has happened, and all the laws of our universe, then you can theoretically predict whatever shall come to pass. What this means for us simple thinking things is that our actions are also determined. They are still meaningful, and perhaps even still conscious and deliberated, but still determined because of the past and the laws of nature. Whether or not this affects our free will is something that both compatibilists and incompatibilists try to answer.
Free will has been related in a number of ways. It’s perhaps the most daunting subject of the philosophical world, and certainly one of the most contested. What we will refer to it as is a commonly accepted form. Free will is the ability a thinking thing has to choose between alternatives- suggesting that whenever one of us is presented with multiple choices, we have the capability to decide upon one choice instead of the others. One could stop reading the paper here, or one could continue reading. Free will would state that one continued reading because one had the alternative of not reading on, but decided to act on the other choice of continuation. Moral responsibility is tied directly to free will. When we possess the freedom of our actions, it follows that we can be held responsible for our actions. Likewise, without free will, it is impossible for us to be held responsible for our actions.
We can now come back to compatibilism. It’s first assumed, for a compatibilist vantage, that determinism is true. Next, it’s assumed that within this deterministic world, free will also maintains to be true. At first glance this may appear to be a contradiction, but it isn’t. Not surprisingly, it depends on how you interpret free will. Hume, for example, provides that free will isn’t the ability to make a different choice under the exact same circumstances. Rather, it’s the (hypothetical) ability to make a different choice under different circumstances. When one continues to read this paper, we aren’t asserting that one choose to read over not reading. We assert that the desire to read caused it to continue. Had the desire been different, the choice made would also be different. With these conditions, compatibilism seems to work.
Now that it’s understood what compatibilism is, we can begin to discuss against its case. What we’re arguing for is just the opposite of compatibility. We’re arguing for incompatibility. Free will is incompatible with determinism. Meaning that free will is true and determinism is false (libertarianism), or that free will is false and determinism is true (hard determinism). Adhering to this incompatibility are a few staple arguments that we will assume to.
Our first argument is known as the intuition pump. Let’s suppose that determinism is true (a necessary condition for compatibilism). Determinism states that the past, in combination with the laws of nature, determines what our actions will turn out to be. What that tells us is, in a sense, we are no different from that of a robot. Each one of our actions is casually determined, just like the programming in a robot. We are determined to act a certain way because of this. Furthermore, we have only one way, a way in which we have no control over- just like a robot. We’re simply reacting as we’re programmed to act. When certain conditions are given to a person, the person is guaranteed to act a certain way. The laws of nature dictate our conduct. All we are are just greatly advanced robots, that aren’t fully understood (yet; otherwise, we’d be like Laplace’s demon). This lack of free will is potentially one consequence of a determinist viewpoint, as this example above shows.
The next argument is in regards to causation. Again, we’ll suppose that determinism is true. A criminal acts out against another person, shooting him in the face, killing him. In this, it is possible to state that the criminal cannot be held responsible for his action (an outrageous claim from an ethical standpoint). Yes, it was he that did it, but he isn’t necessarily the primary cause for his action. Since determinism explains that our actions, as well as ourselves, are the products of past events, it follows that we can only be held accountable for the actions- not responsible. This is because the causation of these actions doesn’t originate within us. The criminal’s desire to pull the trigger was caused by his current mental state, which was caused maybe by an unstable situation, which stemmed from the two seeing each other on that day, and so forth, all the way back to the criminal’s birth. Once again, we find that a consequence of determinism is the lack of free will.
Last is an argument that was hinted at in the previous two- the consequence argument. A normal, thinking thing cannot possibly have control over the past, or over the laws of nature. This is true for any viewpoint. If determinism holds true, and we are the products of the past and the laws of nature, then we can’t possibly be held responsible for the consequences of either. We don’t have control over any of the consequences from the past or the laws of nature, and for ourselves, as we are also consequences of these. For every action that we do, it is the only action that we could’ve done at that time. If we do otherwise (even hypothetically), then we’re either creating or contradiction, or changing either the past of the laws of nature. One continues reading this because that is the only choice that exists. To have done anything else would mean one of the following: something in the past changed that lead to the cause of this, a law of nature was changed that allowed this, or a contradiction, a logical fallacy, has arisen. This argument renders us in a world where, when determinism is true, free will can’t possibly be true.
Hopefully I’ve demonstrated why an incompatibilist viewpoint is preferable to a compatibilist one. Whether you choose to be a libertarian, or are destined to be a hard determinist, or any incompatibilist philosophy for that I matter, is entirely your action. I can’t decide for you, but only share my perspective.
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