Solipsism and The problem of other minds

[mhss1992]

As a matter of fact, all of the existence you know is your perception. Everything you experience is inside your mind.

When you think about it, you realize that there's no way you can be sure whether there really is an objective reality or not. You also can't be sure whether the people around you, despite their behavior, actually feel or think at all like you do.

Even though they look similar to you and act in a similar way to you, everything could still be a very well done illusion to make you believe that there are others like you, when, in fact, you're the only thing in existence, other than whatever's responsible for this illusion.

Most people completely ignore this subject, but it has always fascinated me.

Have you ever had solipsist thoughts? That is, have you ever considered the possibility that existence and your mind are the same?

I have seriously considered this. It souds insane, I know. But why does it sound insane? Why, despite the fact that both possibilities are absolutely impossible to prove, people choose to believe in an external reality with other minds? Are the reasons behind this entirely emotional or simply instinctive? It's certainly easier to live when you treat people like they have minds.

I do admit, though, that the thought that you're completely alone in existence can cause extreme despair and loneliness, but it somehow gives a notion of power as well.

[Yieldsign]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

People ignore it because the "illusion" (not to imply that it isn't real, but only that it isn't verifiable) of an objective reality with other minds is strong and convincing enough to the point where it really isn't a practical issue (practical used in the loosest sense - obviously most philosophical issues aren't practical, but some at least have implications that could conceivably affect us in some way).

At any rate, there are plenty of arguments against solipsism - most are probability oriented/empirical. The most effective, in my opinion, is simply an inference from the similarity in the physical responses of other bodies to one's own - it's easy enough to infer that they probably have similar mental processes. Of course, that's not definitive, but it's an argument that is inconsequential enough to me that it doesn't require definitive refutation.

If you want a logical approach, Sartre offers arguments against solipsism that arise from his ontology - but I don't agree with his ontology and so I don't buy his arguments. I won't bother expanding on that here but if you're interested, you should look up that material.

[rushyrulz]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

/thread

[Relambrien]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

You've probably already read at least some Descartes already, but if you haven't, I recommend it. He basically says the exact same thing you did, and tries to figure out what he can prove is true based on that.

One of his arguments goes like this: Consider some evil demon, whose only purpose is to trick you with every single thing you perceive or observe, including the fact that he doesn't exist. Red is actually blue, your computer is actually a lump of Jello (and your visual and touch sensations are being fooled into believing it's solid), whatever. Obviously, there's very little that we can say is certain about our existences given this, since we can't disprove that the demon exists.

However, the very fact that such a demon--if it did exist--would be able to trick you, implies that there is something for it to trick. That is, you exist, with certainty. Similarly, the concepts of "shape" and "color" also exist, as well as a few other things. Even if we assume the worst possible scenario, these things will still be true. You can check out some more of what he said if you're curious, in his Meditations.

Anyway, the way I reconciled myself with this possibility is that even if it were true, since I have no way of verifying one way or the other, it doesn't actually matter if it's true. I'm going to behave the same way regardless, since I can never find out what I -should- be doing. Might as well act assuming things are as I perceive them, since I get much more use and satisfaction out of my life that way.

[Yieldsign]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

You've probably already read at least some Descartes already, but if you haven't, I recommend it. He basically says the exact same thing you did, and tries to figure out what he can prove is true based on that.

well i would assert that descartes more intended to disprove the initial assumptions set forth (radical skepticism) through what he proves; there is a definite goal in mind, it isn't simply "let's see what conclusions arise from skepticism" as much as "let's assume skepticism and see how we can disprove it." regardless, it's pretty much unanimously agreed that he failed in this regard.

However, the very fact that such a demon--if it did exist--would be able to trick you, implies that there is something for it to trick. That is, you exist, with certainty. Similarly, the concepts of "shape" and "color" also exist, as well as a few other things. Even if we assume the worst possible scenario, these things will still be true. You can check out some more of what he said if you're curious, in his Meditations.

what you've essentially stated is a reformulated ergo, sum cogito (i am, i exist) which isn't necessarily valid. as sartre states, the ergo sum cogito should be restated as "it thinks, it exists." what if the "i" that think is part of a collective conscious or is a figment of something else's imagination? of course, in SOME sense there is still an "i," even if it is fictitious, but that raises some interesting questions about autonomy. anyway, you make a leap from "i" existing to "concepts like shape and color" existing - neither of which are mandated by the existence of an ego. in fact, he uses God to prove the veracity of such concepts - and without God, he can't defeat skepticism, or solipsism. and he can't prove God

Anyway, the way I reconciled myself with this possibility is that even if it were true, since I have no way of verifying one way or the other, it doesn't actually matter if it's true. I'm going to behave the same way regardless, since I can never find out what I -should- be doing. Might as well act assuming things are as I perceive them, since I get much more use and satisfaction out of my life that way.

let's slightly modify that to say: believe what we have no way of disproving is perceptually accurate, but question our perceptions on a fundamental level.

[FuzenAkuma]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

I have always been fascinated by solipsism ever since I played Star Ocean: Till the End of Time. Since then, I have accepted that there is no way to disprove that any existence outside of my mind, nor disprove that anything outside of my mind does not exist. That being said, I don't believe that my mind is the only thing that exists or vice-versa; I am a complete agnostic regarding this.

[Yieldsign]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

agnosticism is pretty much the only answer to solopsism unless your ontology allows for its refutation, in which case your ontology is probably flawed

[Relambrien]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

what you've essentially stated is a reformulated ergo, sum cogito (i am, i exist) which isn't necessarily valid. as sartre states, the ergo sum cogito should be restated as "it thinks, it exists." what if the "i" that think is part of a collective conscious or is a figment of something else's imagination? of course, in SOME sense there is still an "i," even if it is fictitious, but that raises some interesting questions about autonomy. anyway, you make a leap from "i" existing to "concepts like shape and color" existing - neither of which are mandated by the existence of an ego. in fact, he uses God to prove the veracity of such concepts - and without God, he can't defeat skepticism, or solipsism. and he can't prove God

Well yeah, I'm saying what Descartes did. He's the one who created the cogito, ergo sum argument after all.

But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.

Also, you're right about the color thing, on second thought it might have been Russell who talked about that. But Descartes says this about other qualities:

And with regard to the ideas of corporeal objects, I never discovered in them anything so great or excellent which I myself did not appear capable of originating; for, by considering these ideas closely and scrutinizing them individually, in the same way that I yesterday examined the idea of wax, I find that there is but little in them that is clearly and distinctly perceived. As belonging to the class of things that are clearly apprehended, I recognize the following, viz, magnitude or extension in length, breadth, and depth; figure, which results from the termination of extension; situation, which bodies of diverse figures preserve with reference to each other; and motion or the change of situation; to which may be added substance, duration, and number. But with regard to light, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat, cold, and the other tactile qualities, they are thought with so much obscurity and confusion, that I cannot determine even whether they are true or false;

And later...

In the same way, when I think of myself as now existing, and recollect besides that I existed some time ago, and when I am conscious of various thoughts whose number I know, I then acquire the ideas of duration and number, which I can afterward transfer to as many objects as I please. With respect to the other qualities that go to make up the ideas of corporeal objects, viz, extension, figure, situation, and motion, it is true that they are not formally in me, since I am merely a thinking being; but because they are only certain modes of substance, and because I myself am a substance, it seems possible that they may be contained in me eminently.

I have a question though--why do you think Descartes was trying to disprove radical skepticism? The very opening of Meditations I basically outlines his goal: get rid of all of the false "truths" he had thought he had known throughout his life, leaving only those of which he could be 100% certain.

SEVERAL years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions], and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions.

[Yieldsign]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

Well yeah, I'm saying what Descartes did. He's the one who created the cogito, ergo sum argument after all.



Also, you're right about the color thing, on second thought it might have been Russell who talked about that. But Descartes says this about other qualities:



And later...



I have a question though--why do you think Descartes was trying to disprove radical skepticism? The very opening of Meditations I basically outlines his goal: get rid of all of the false "truths" he had thought he had known throughout his life, leaving only those of which he could be 100% certain.

well... i don't know if you have any academic education on this matter, but it is largely accepted that descartes' intention was to disprove skepticism, refute it "on its own ground," so to speak. it is well known that descartes thought all science (and more importantly, his system of physics) should be based on a certainty, and he tried to attain this certainty by stretching skepticism to its limits and still finding it. He failed, but ya.

[mhss1992]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

what you've essentially stated is a reformulated ergo, sum cogito (i am, i exist) which isn't necessarily valid. as sartre states, the ergo sum cogito should be restated as "it thinks, it exists." what if the "i" that think is part of a collective conscious or is a figment of something else's imagination? of course, in SOME sense there is still an "i," even if it is fictitious, but that raises some interesting questions about autonomy. anyway, you make a leap from "i" existing to "concepts like shape and color" existing - neither of which are mandated by the existence of an ego.

I disagree. There is one absolute truth, as far as I can see: I feel.
If I feel, I definitely am something, which means I exist (by definition). It doesn't matter HOW I exist, but I still exist.

Also, about the "concepts like shape and color" , I really think you should read about qualia.

[Yieldsign]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

well, I don't think you can discount the possibility that the subject is completely constructed and that to say "I feel" isn't really saying anything definitive at all.

[mhss1992]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

well, I don't think you can discount the possibility that the subject is completely constructed and that to say "I feel" isn't really saying anything definitive at all.

Yes, it is. Look at the first statement in the thread. Can you argue with that?
Everything that I know is really what I feel.
Something is felt (certainly), and if there is feeling, there must be someone to feel it.

What do you mean by constructed? All of the concepts used in the statement "I feel" are based on the most evident things in existence.

What would you consider to be more certain than that?

/thread

How exactly was that relevant to this particular thread?

[Yieldsign]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

Yes, it is. Look at the first statement in the thread. Can you argue with that?
Everything that I know is really what I feel.
Something is felt (certainly), and if there is feeling, there must be someone to feel it.

What do you mean by constructed? All of the concepts used in the statement "I feel" are based on the most evident things in existence.

What would you consider to be more certain than that?




How exactly was that relevant to this particular thread?

It's not so much a statement about anything being more certain than that so much as a limit on what IS certain. I'll try to articulate my thoughts more clearly later when I'm not drugged out and delirious from sleep deprivation

[devonin]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

The problem is that your perception could be 100% faulty in all cases. If "all you know" is your perception, then you don't actually -KNOW- anything at all, because you have no way to determing if what you are perceiving is real.

Cartesian Doubt also has little if anything to do with the problem of Solipsism. Descartes completely fails to put out a rational argument in support of other minds, and barely even gets through proving a thing beyond that he is sure he exists (which isn't applicable to us, because we can't corroborate his statements about himself)

You can use the concepts of Cogito, Ergo Sum as a groundwork for supporting Solipsism, but the fact is that Solipsism is pretty much impossible to disprove to someone who has already accepted it, and there's actually no amount of evidence, full stop, that can't be explained away by a solipsist as a construction, so it's entirely moot to make the attempt.

[mhss1992]

Re: Solipsism and The problem of other minds

The problem is that your perception could be 100% faulty in all cases. If "all you know" is your perception, then you don't actually -KNOW- anything at all, because you have no way to determing if what you are perceiving is real.

Unless you consider perception a reality of it's own. It does exist somehow, but only to a single observer.
Think about it... The main difference between "external reality" and "dreams" is the fact that external reality is "public" and dreams are "private".

Also... "100% faulty" doesn't really make sense when you consider that the "real" universe has no image of itself (it can't possibly have, as it's no observer on it's own). It doesn't really "perceive" itself in a way that's considered "correct". Perception will always be an interpretation of imageless data, and, therefore, will never be the same as the thing-in-itself.

In other words... Either every perception is "false", because no perception can be the same as reality, or every perception is "true", because it's still a valid interpretation that allows you to interact with this universe in some way.

Did I sound confusing?